Youth asset losses in fragile environments

 

Children of Zaatari camp | Photo credit Oxfam International

The iconic images of the Syrian civil war involve children: children fleeing across the border with their family, children being rescued from urban bombings, and children being carried by parents in search of safety and medical care.  These images of children as victims, observers, and bystanders, reflect an understanding of children as needful of nurture and protection.

During conflicts children face many threats to their health and well-being.  They also risk asset losses that can follow them into their adult years.   Notable examples are the stories of Holocaust survivors. Many survivors learned of family assets late in their lives and then struggled to reclaim them.

Where there is forced displacement, assets are often lost.  In some cases, like Syria, this is intentional. There “ Property registries have been deliberately bombed, title deeds are seized at military checkpoints and new laws have been passed to make it easier for the regime to grab land, businesses and homes.”  Syrian families are losing assets.  When it becomes possible to return to Syria, reclaiming assets will be a challenge.  Young people raised in places of refuge may not know what the family assets are.  They might lack documentation or be unaware of the steps they need to take in order to reclaim assets.  This negatively impacts their ability to rebuild their lives if/when they return home.

Asset loss for children is a problem in many fragile environments.  During the HIV/AIDs pandemic years in Sub-Saharan Africa, many children lost their parents and then lost family property to relatives or outsiders.  Their economic opportunities became limited when they lost property assets.

In a recent article, Protecting Future Rights for Future Citizens, I suggest ways to protect children’s access to assets.  My suggestions target both states and humanitarian organizations.  I argue that states that do not currently legally protect children’s assets from expropriation should do so.  South Africa’s Children’s Act provides an excellent example of how to do this. Humanitarian organizations can also take actions to prevent this problem.  They can collect records on family assets of displaced people, include children as owners of those assets, and record them in a way that is both secure and portable.  Blockchain technology allows record storage that is both private and protected.  It is used for property records in Honduras and Estonia.  Recording children’s future assets  provides the means for them to reclaim family property.

The average length of displacement as a result of violence is 17 years – time enough for children to grow up and begin to support themselves.  Creating the possibility for young people to return home and reclaim assets is one way of facilitating community reconstruction after conflict.

What Kind of Property is a Syllabus? 

 

What Kind of Property is a Syllabus? 

At this turn of the new year, professors are thinking about syllabi for the spring semester.  As chair of a committee tasked with making a recommendation about the public availability of syllabi, they are on my mind for an entirely different reason.  My committee received a proposal from student government.  The students wanted the online availability of syllabi to help them in the selection of classes.  Naively, I thought this was such an obvious decision that a meeting was unnecessary – of course my esteemed colleagues would want to share their syllabi.  Not so.  My initial survey of committee members led to a list of concerns, high among them the issue that a syllabus is intellectual property.

Intellectual property refers to ‘creations of the mind’ usually those that lead to some sort of potential for profit such as works of art, published materials or technological developments.  These are protected in law by patents, copyrights and trademarks.  While few of us view our syllabi to be works of art we usually feel that there is an element of creativity, expertise and experience that is folded into the required readings and assignments, making the syllabus distinctly different from an academic regulation or policy.  There is widespread agreement in the academy and the courts that the syllabus is a kind of intellectual property. But whose intellectual property is it and what sort of property?

In Missouri the Court of Appeals determined that professors have intellectual property rights to their syllabi and universities are not obligated to make syllabi public.  Texas courts have followed a different path by legally requiring public colleges and universities to post their syllabi.  As a scholar of real property rights, I have been wrestling with a different issue – what kind of property is the syllabus?

Scholars of property rights like to talk about property ownership regimes as a bundle of sticks representing all of the different rights one can have to a thing.  In my bundle might be the right to buy and sell, the right to rent, the right to divide the property,  and the right to pass it on to my children.  Most of the conversation around syllabi ownership has proceeded as if the metaphorical bundle of rights is private property – either the faculty member owns the syllabus or the academic institution owns it.  But there are many different types of property ownership and we might benefit from thinking about syllabi as a different sort of property regime.

Elinor Ostrom won a Nobel Prize for her work on common property regimes in which ownership is vested in a community and the control of the resource is managed collectively through rules and punishments determined by the group.  Some professors like to think this way about their syllabi – they develop them collaboratively with students and view the syllabus as a mutually accepted and binding agreement.  The movement towards ‘collaborative syllabus’ creation is arguably a shift from private to common property with ownership vested in the students as well as the professor.  Syllabi can also be common property if they are created by a group of professors, for example a team of professors who are all teaching different sections of the same introductory course.

Another way of conceiving the property rights entailed in a syllabus is one of sharecropping (or more negatively, serfdom).  In sharecropping arrangements, there is a property owner who allows the tenant farmer to use their land in exchange for a portion of the harvest.  I find this metaphor to be more aligned with the way I run my courses and conceive of syllabi. It implies a hierarchy of power (owner/tenant) which seems to align well with the university /faculty relationship.  The University provides my salary, the classroom and the students and I am to use these resources in the creation of the final product – the harvest of learning.

I am a proponent of intellectual property rights; I want control over the fruits of my academic labor.  Yet, I would not put syllabi in the same category of work as an original manuscript, a patent, or a work of art.  Syllabi are constrained by rules set by colleges and universities such as the time frame of the semester, department policies, and the availability of resources.  While I want private property rights to my books and articles, I can be content with a sharecropping arrangement regarding syllabi.

 

Return Migration of Serbs to Kosovo

Serb Returnees and Population Distribution (Joireman 2017)

There are a few things we know about return migration after violent conflict, and quite a bit we have yet to learn.  Many people who are forcibly displaced by violence have no desire to go back home, particularly if they were part of a minority group.  Indeed, Adelman and Barkman (2011) have noted that while minority return is an expectation it is rarely a reality.  Instead when we see large populations returns after violent conflict it is usually the majority population returning or in those very few circumstances where both the government and returnees are happy with the outcome of the conflict.  Even then, they do not necessarily return to their communities of origin, but often to urban areas.

Hundreds of thousands of Serbs were forcibly displaced by the Kosovo War in 1998-1999.  Efforts to promote their return to Kosovo have not met with much success.  My recent article in International Migration investigates minority Serb returns to Kosovo, examining the question of where they return.  The analysis identifies a pattern of preference for return to traditionally Serb rural areas in Kosovo.  This is somewhat unusual.  Based on what has happened in other countries, we would expect returnees to come back to cities, particularly since large numbers of Serbs were displaced from urban areas.  But this is not what is happening.

Serb Returns

When we exclude the four northern Serb municipalities which do not function as part of the state of Kosovo, the municipalities with the highest numbers of Serb returnees are rural.  Surprisingly, of the three municipalities with the highest number of returnees (Klinë/Klina, Novobërdë/Novo Brde, and Istog/Istok) only Novobërdë/Novo Brde is a Serb-majority municipality created under the Ahtisaari Plan.  This is a little puzzling.  One might expect that Serbs would return to areas where they had political control and protection.  Also strange is the fact that people are returning to areas with some of the highest rates of retaliatory violence during the war.  So what could be happening, why might people be returning to these rural municipalities?

Some of the recent work on civil wars suggests that the violence is often localized, enacted within a larger narrative of conflict, but often with personal and local motivations.  Return migration might have somewhat similar characteristics in which the local community is more important than the wider political environment.  In rural ethnic enclaves Serbs can enjoy the society of their co-ethnics in relative security and isolated from the national political context.   In some of the interviews I conducted for this project people talked about the importance of Serbian schools, churches, and ‘girls for the boys to marry’.

While this may not seem desirable in terms of longer term reconciliation between ethnic groups, in the short term it enables people to feel secure in their daily environment.  Like in Bosnia, ethnic enclaves in Kosovo isolate people from the ethnic other, providing a safe option for return after ethnic conflict.  The decision to return to an enclave community meets the public policy goal of return, but is far from a restoration of communities to what they were before the conflict.

Dying fast or dying slowly: food aid and migration

Before taking his family on the passage from Jordan to Europe, Mounib Zakiya told the BBC “Its better to die fast on the journey, than die slowly, watching your kids starve.” He lived in Jordan for three years after fleeing the Syrian civil war.  His family was among many Syrian refugees affected by significantly reduced food rations in 2015.  The World Food Program (WFP) was underfunded  that year by 63 percent and calls to governments around the world for assistance were not met with the needed support.  2015 was the second year in a row in which the WFP did not receive its needed funding, in spite of a  worldwide increase in humanitarian assistance .

The cuts to Syrian refugees were significant.  In Lebanon, food vouchers were cut in half  to US$13.50 per person per month.  In Jordan, 230,000 Syrian refugees living outside of camps lost their food aid entirely.  As a result, families were forced to make impossible decisions in order to survive -taking children out of school, skipping meals, going into debt, or fleeing to Europe.

The WFP’s reduced aid drastically influenced a wave of Syrian refugees from Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey to Europe in 2015.  By foot and by boat, they flooded into Greece and the Balkans countries in search of refuge, risking dangerous travel and an uncertain future rather than remain and starve.

 

Lessons not learned

The take-away from the experience of mass Syrian migration – that maintaining food rations is important in keeping refugees and migrants in the place of refuge closest to their country – appears to have been forgotten.  The World Food Program recently announced another shortfall in funding that would require it to reduce rations across a number of African countries hosting refugees.  In Uganda, which hosts 600,000 refugees and asylum seekers from Burundi, South Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Congo, those who arrived before 2015 had their rations cut by 50%.

Assisting refugees to remain within their region makes sense for a number of reasons:

  • Those who are physically proximate to their place of origin can more easily return when peace is restored
  • It prevents refugees from making dangerous journeys across oceans or deserts without adequate preparation or protection.
  • There will be less need for human traffickers who financially benefit from their movement.
  • It reduces the number of people trying to migrate to Europe or other northern countries to try their luck with the international asylum system.

Massive forced migration is not good for anyone. The further away from home people need to go for safety the farther they are from their houses, farms, businesses and the local information that they need to make an informed decision to return.  In 2015 alone, 65 million people were displaced as a result of violence, enough to form a country the size of France.  Enabling people to remain in areas closer to home is a pragmatic international response that is in the best interests of all.  However, it comes at a price, which is the assistance that people need to live in places of refuge.

 

Dr. Sandra Joireman is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Richmond and Chair of the Board of Directors of Bread for the World.  You can follow her on twitter @joireman or www.sandrajoireman.com.

The European Migration Crisis Up Close

I am conducting research in Serbia for a few weeks on post-conflict return migration.  While I interview people impacted by a war nearly twenty years ago, another migration crisis is playing out in front of me.

Serbia is part of the ‘Balkans Route’ of migration to Europe.  It was a real hotspot in 2015 when tens of thousands of Syrian refugees surged into Europe through Serbia and into Hungary, the first EU country where they could declare asylum.  That changed with the agreement between Turkey and the EU in March of 2016 that stemmed the flow of refugees out of Turkey.

serbia-migration-route

However, Syrian refugees were not the only ones who were trying to get into the EU.  Migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq are also on the move and have made it to Serbia. Some are fleeing war and others looking for better economic opportunity in the EU.

In the wake of an anti-immigration vote in Hungary last week, those migrants in Serbia hoping for passage to an EU country are likely to be disappointed.   They seem to be aware of this fact.  Earlier this week after the Hungarian referendum hundreds of migrants left Belgrade to walk to the Hungarian border,.  They demanded that the border be opened for people fleeing war and poverty.  The peaceful demonstration ended after a day and the protesters were bussed back to Belgrade.

In Serbia several thousand migrants wait in camps and reception centers.  Around 700 are staying in two parks in the center of Belgrade, the capital city.

belgrade-10161

Migrants in Belgrade Park

The presence of migrants in the parks is both glaringly obvious and completely normalized.  Most of the migrants are young, brown-skinned men in a city filled with Slavs.  The parks – indecisively cordoned off with orange plastic fencing – are open and residents pass through normally, as do students attending classes at the adjacent Economics Faculty building (visible in the background of the photo below).

belgrade10163

Economics Faculty Building

The migrants are not interested in staying in Serbia.  Only a small percentage has filled out asylum applications.  They aspire to make it to the better economic environment of the European Union countries.

To date the Serbian community has been remarkably hospitable.  Humanitarian organizations distribute blankets and food and provide mobile clinics for healthcare.   This would look much different in America, where no illegal migrant could be so public about their status and the migrants would most likely be treated as a threat.  Perhaps the suffering of Serbs during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s has made them compassionate regarding the situations of others touched by war.  Or they are simply not a threat because they have no desire to stay in Serbia.  Recent statements from the Serb president call the continuation of this hospitality into question.  Meanwhile, life carries on around the migrants – students attend their classes and Serbs come and go to the bus and train stations across the street.

These young men will not have an easy time.  Those that can qualify as refugees have some hope, but those who came in search of better economic opportunities are unlikely to find willing host countries in the EU.  EU countries balk at the demands on them to take in Syrian refugees.  Compassion will be in short supply for economic migrants.

Religious Symbols, War, and Peace-building

This is Christ the Savior Cathedral, which stands on the campus of the University of Pristina in Kosovo. It is odd for a church to be on this campus – the university is secular and 95% of the people of Kosovo are Muslim.

How it Came to be There

Kosovo fought a war with Serbia in 1998-1999 later declaring independence in 2008. Tensions were high during the decade before the war, Kosovans wanted greater autonomy and the Serbian controlled government resisted their demands.  In the midst of that turbulent era, the Serbian Orthodox Church started construction on a new cathedral, Christ the Savior, in the middle of the campus of the University of Pristina.  Construction began in 1995 and was never completed because of the war.  Building the church there was an affront to the Muslim, Albanian population.  Yet, it was legal.  The title to the land belongs to the Orthodox Church (indeed, they controversially own most of the land on which the University of Pristina sits).

The timing and location of this particular religious building make it presence less than irenic. Serbs, and everyone else in Kosovo, should have the right to freely express their faith and meet together for worship. Yet, as is clear from other countries, the peaceful practice of multiple religions demands sensitivity to image and intent.

And now….

The church has remained unfinished, deserted, and boarded up – an icon of the conflict and ongoing religious cleavages in Kosovo. Then this month, some Orthodox Serbs started to clean the church. Students reacted immediately, staging sit-ins and protesting the presence of the church on campus.

Religion and Reconciliation

One of the characteristics of the Serbian Orthodox faith is the way in which church spaces – interiors and architecture – educate those present about the relationship between God and human beings. The mosaics and paintings recount biblical stories and historic events; the temporal links to the spiritual through the aesthetics of space and beauty.  Worshippers have a full sensory experience in services through the paintings and icons, music and incense.  For a tradition that places such value on place in its worship, it is a pity that this space of worship has become so politicized.

As others have noted before me, there is an ambivalence to religion’s role in conflict. Religion can resolve and ameliorate conflicts or make them worse. In this case, the latter is the accurate description. The church reminds people of the dominance of Serbia over Kosovo and the dark days leading up to the war. There are few Serbs left in the city after the war who could use the cathedral as a place of worship even if it were to be completed.

Orthodox religious leaders could model the reconciling nature of Christ should they use the occasion of the recent demonstrations to build peace, rather than reinforce the existing divisions. It would be healing if Orthodox Church leaders would initiate an open and public discussion about what should be done with the unfinished cathedral, acknowledging the manner and context in which the church was built and considering alternative purposes for the building, such as museum, lecture hall, or campus gathering space.

Serbian Orthodox churches are designed to connect the temporal and spiritual. This cathedral could serve as a symbol of healing and reconciliation in a divided and politicized society, rather than a symbol of the conflict.

Flags, Anthems and the Rio Olympics

As Kosovo competes in its first Olympics at Rio its athletes marched in under a flag no one uses and its medal winners will listen to an anthem with no words.  The flag and anthem arouse little emotion from the 92% of the population of Kosovo who are ethnic Albanians.  Far more evocative is the banner with the Albanian, black, double-headed eagle on a red background and the battle anthem of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or in Albanian, UCK) which led the fight for independence in the 1999 war.  But neither the most popular flag nor the most resonant song represent this small state.  Why not?  Because the Albanian population shares the tiny state of Kosovo with other ethnic groups, most notably Serbs, but also Roma, Gorani, Ashkali, Egyptian and Bosniaks.

The Triumph of Civic over Ethnic Nationalism?

The ethnic nationalism which led to the fight for the independence of Kosovo in 1998-1999 and the solidarity of the Albanian people of Kosovo during a long and pacifist protest through the early 1990s took a more sinister turn after victory.  When the Serbian armed forces withdrew from Kosovo in 1999 after the NATO bombing, they left a vulnerable Serb population in Kosovo and an armed KLA.  Serb civilians were targets of retaliatory violence in 1999 and then again in 2004 during a period of ethnic riots.  As a result 220,000 Serbs left Kosovo and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo did all it could to turn the state to a more positive, encompassing, civic nationalism.  Civic nationalism is the attachment to the state, as opposed to ethnic nationalism which is the attachment to the ethnic group.  The Assembly of Kosovo, to demonstrate its inclusivity when it declared independence in 2008, adopted a flag with the image of the in yellow on a blue background (with the colors similar to the EU flag) and oversaw the choice of a national anthem entitled ‘Europa’ for which there are no words, chosen by the Assembly because it did not reference any ethnic group.

Ensuring that the symbols of the state are not considered the property of a single ethnic group is important everywhere.  But it does not lead to an embrace of multiethnic, or even civic, values.  While I was teaching in Kosovo in 2013, my students expressed the wish that the symbols of the state had a more distinctly Albanian character.  Yet, Kosovo struggles with ongoing low-level violence and harassment against its minority populations and the economy is characterized by what political scientist Edward Banfield referred to as ‘amoral familialism’ in which the material advantage of the family is privileged over the well-being of the community.  This, in a country which already has significant barriers to economic growth and opportunity.

Nothing makes people feel nationalism like the Olympics.  It is a chance to cheer on the best young athletes in our country and watch them challenge, hopefully triumph, over the greatest athletes in the world.  If Kosovo’s Majlinda Kelmendi wins an anticipated medal in judo, expect to see red and black Albanian flags waving in the stands.

White House Summit on Global Development

It was a privilege to be able to attend the White House Summit on Global Development on July 20.  The Summit was a celebratory event, highlighting the development achievements in the Obama administration with an eye to influencing the agenda of the next administration.  President Obama spoke at the end of the day, which was a highlight.  There were a number of other interesting issues that came up at the Summit.

Global Food Security Act

Part of the reason for the Summit was to announce the signing of the Global Food Security Act, which was a major achievement for the development community.  The Global Food Security Act received substantial bipartisan support to turn the Feed the Future initiative of USAID, which increased investments in smallholder agriculture around the world, into law.  I worked with Bread for the World to get this passed.  Bread was only one of a number of anti-hunger groups pushing to get this through.

Health as Bipartisan Achievement

One of the panels at the Summit was on global health and there was a nice bipartisan nod to the achievements of the Bush Administration on HIV/AIDS, as well as the more expected congratulation to the Obama administration on its response to Ebola.  Global health issues made it into Obama’s speech as well as a call out to the Congress to pass funding to combat the Zika Virus.

Civil Society and Open Government

Samantha Power led a great panel on transparency and open government.  While some of the conversation a focused on the importance of government accountability, the issue of the use of law to restrict civil society was also addressed.  Douglas Rutzen from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law talked about the ‘rule by law’ rather than the ‘rule of law’.  He was indicating the trend of authoritarian governments using laws to restrict the activities of civil society rather than using law to protect those activities.  I have heard this same thing in field research in Ethiopia in the past and then more recently in Uganda, so it was good to hear it emphasized by those in the government.  Morgan Lee in Christianity Today recently wrote a piece about how laws that are intended to restrict pro-democracy organizations effect Christian groups and presumably other religious groups as well.

Strong institutions as the basis of sustainable development 

“Turns out functioning governments are really important”   This is my favorite quote from Obama’s speech.  As a political scientist it makes me happy to hear this said. Functioning governments are critical to development but, as the Samantha Power panel noted, law can also be used to restrict the voice of civil society.  The best governments use law to promote the flourishing of their population, the worst use it to restrict them.

Pinheiro Principles and the Voluntary Guidelines

The 2005 Pinheiro Principles were the first summative statement regarding property rights in post-conflict settings.  They were the result of a UN Sub-Commission tasked with applying human rights law to post-conflict housing, land, and property issues for refugees and internally displaced people.   In arriving at the Pinheiro Principles the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights consulted with legal experts, civil society organizations and states.  They were helpful, but imperfect, as these things often are.  They have been challenged in terms of their legal foundations and I have reservations about their applicability in situations with customary law.

The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, actually have a longer title yet, but are most often just referred to as ‘The Voluntary Guidelines”.   They were adopted in 2012 after a remarkable consultative process lead by the FAO Committee on World Food Security.  Negotiations over the guidelines occurred in 2011 and 2012, as the world was still reeling from the 2008 Food Price Crisis.  The Voluntary Guidelines are notable for bringing together food sovereignty advocates in over 30 civil society organizations and the 96 UN member states that negotiated the agreement.    They are broader than the Pinheiro Principles as they address land governance in all contexts, not just post-conflict.  They also address the concerns of people such as myself, interested in seeing customary law directly addressed.

The Voluntary What?

However, there is a major problem with the Voluntary Guidelines.  Apart from those directly involved in the consultations, and perhaps also some of my students, no one seems to know they exist.  Of course I exaggerate, but not too much.  In the past month I have reviewed two academic papers by very smart people writing on land restitution issues, who seemingly have never heard of the Voluntary Guidelines.  Why?  How could it be that people are not aware of the Voluntary Guidelines in spite of the remarkable effort and extensive consultation that went into developing them?

Here are my three ideas about the causes of this ignorance.

  • Voluntary is interpreted as irrelevant. This isn’t true.  The Voluntary Guidelines are no more or less enforceable than the Pinheiro Principles.  It is all ‘soft’ international law and therefore has no specific enforcement mechanism, but is meant to guide organizations and governments in making decisions.

 

  • Post-conflict issues are buried in Section 25 after multiple preceding sections addressing riveting issues such as valuation, taxation and spatial planning. Personally, I do find spatial planning compelling, but I realize that not everyone agrees with me.

 

  • The focus in the Voluntary Guidelines on respecting marginalized people and ensuring food security for all, means that they are more complex than the Pinheiro Principles, which are very straightforward and easy to understand. By way of example, here is the way that property restitution is discussed in each.

 

Pinheiro Principle 2 The right to housing and property restitution

2.1 All refugees and displaced persons have the right to have restored to them any housing, land and/or property of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or to be compensated for any housing, land and/ or property that is factually impossible to restore as determined by an independent, impartial tribunal.

 

And the equivalent passage in the Voluntary Guidelines

VG 25.5 In situations of conflicts, whenever possible or when conflicts cease, States and other parties should ensure that tenure problems are addressed in ways that contribute to gender equality and support durable solutions for those affected. Where restitution is possible and, as appropriate, with the assistance of UNHCR and other relevant agencies, refugees and displaced persons should be assisted in voluntarily, safely and with dignity returning to their place of origin, in line with applicable international standards. Procedures for restitution, rehabilitation and reparation should be nondiscriminatory, gender sensitive and widely publicized, and claims for restitution should be processed promptly. Procedures for restitution of tenure rights of indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems should provide for the use of traditional sources of information.

25.6 Where restitution is not possible, the provision of secure access to alternative land, fisheries and forests and livelihoods for refugees and displaced persons should be negotiated with host communities and other relevant parties to ensure that the resettlement does not jeopardize the livelihoods of others. Special procedures should, where possible, provide the vulnerable, including widows and orphans, with secure access to land, fisheries and forests

You get the picture.

This is all unfortunate.  The Voluntary Guidelines is an important document that is sophisticated in its understanding of tenure systems around the world and prioritizes people and food production.  This is good and necessary, albeit complex.

Property and Return Migration

My most recent research has been on post-conflict return migration, specifically the question of who comes back to their homes and community after violence forces them to leave.  When I started the project  I was solely focused on land issues.  I wanted to know whether property restitution mattered in people’s decisions to return home.  The deeper I got into research on the topic (in Liberia, Uganda and Kosovo) the more I realized that property restitution was only one piece of a very complicated decision –making process that has as much to do with household needs and characteristics, length of displacement and opportunities elsewhere, as with property restitution.

Customary Law

Many places around the world allocate land on the basis of customary law –  a system of rules in which people typically have a claim to land rights because they are members of a group.  For example, because I am Acholi and my family is from northern Uganda, I am a member of a particular lineage with a right to the land that lineage ‘owns’ in northern Uganda.  The specific land I can claim will be determined by lineage or community leaders.  My property right comes from my identity rather than from a deed or title.  In most cases customary law is not written and property rights are not formalized (although that is increasingly changing).

Customary Land Tenure after Conflict

The average length of time people are displaced as a result of violent conflict is 17 years (a depressing statistic!).  Lots of things change in 17 years including the composition of households as family members are born, die, emigrate, etc.   Community leaders also change and new leaders do not necessarily know or remember who lived where or had claim to what land.

Laura Meitzner Yoder and I address some of the challenges of return migration to areas with customary land in the most recent issue of Development and Change.    While I have research experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, Laura has worked and studied land in Timor-Leste.  We combined our expertise to address the role of customary land in post-conflict migration.  We address the different ways in which post-conflict return can happen (synchronized or punctuated) and also the disconnect between the rights one can claim under customary law (a right to some part of the lineage land) and the rights guaranteed in international public policy on return migration (a right to a specific piece of land or home from which one was displaced).

Customary law creates a different context for property restitution in post-conflict settings.  It can be more flexible than formalized land holding, but it is highly dependent on the leaders who interpret and enforce it.